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Abstract
We consider a caching game in which a unit amount of innitely di-
visible material is distributed among n  2 locations. A Searcher chooses
how to distribute his search e¤ort r about the locations so as to maximize
the probability she will nd a given minimum amount m = 1 m  r of
the material. If the search e¤ort yi invested by the Searcher in a given
location i is at least as great as the amount of material xi located there
she nds all of it, otherwise the amount she nds is only yi. In other words
she nds min fxi; yig in location i. We seek the randomized distribution
of search e¤ort that maximizes the probability of success for the Searcher
in the worst case, hence we model the problem as a zero-sum win-lose
game between the Searcher and a malevolent Hider who wishes to keep
more than m of the material. We show that in the case r = m the game
has a geometric interpretation that for n = 2 corresponds to a problem
posed by W. H. Ruckle in his monograph, Geometric Games and Their
Applications. We give solutions for the geometric game when n = 3 for
certain values of m, and bounds on the value for other values of m. In
the more general case r  m we show that for n = 2 the game reduces to
Ruckles game.
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1 Introduction
Suppose some material is hidden, or cached, in a nite number of locations.
The material may be food hidden by an animal or arms hidden by a terrorist
organization. A Searcher (a pilferer or the military, respectively) looks in some
of the locations and conscates the material that she nds. The amount of e¤ort
the Searcher can invest in searching is limited by a xed resource constraint, and
her aim is to capture a certain minimum amount of the material. The problem
is modeled as a zero-sum game between the Searcher and a Hider, which may be
the squirrel or a terrorist organisation. The Hider wins if the Searcher captures
less than a certain given amount of material, so in the case of the squirrel, it has
enough food to survive the winter, or in the case of the terrorist organisation,
it has enough arms to carry out a planned terrorist attack.
Games of this type were introduced by Kikuta and Ruckle ([16], [17] and
[18]) who called them accumulation games, and have been furthered studied for
example in [2] and [4]. In the most general denition of accumulation games the
Hider accumulates resources in stages over several time periods, but in practice
most of the work in this area has focused on single stage games, which have come
to be called caching games. Usually in such accumulation games, it is assumed
that when a Searcher looks in a location she conscates all the material hidden
there. However, in this paper we assume that the amount of material found in
a location depends not only on how much has been hidden there, but also on
how much e¤ort the Searcher invests in searching the location. This is a natural
assumption, and generalizes the Kikuta-Ruckle model.
We will dene the model formally in Section 2, but we rst illustrate it with
an example. Suppose the Hider has an amount of material which we normalize
to 1. He distributes it about three locations (locations 1, 2 and 3); that is,
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he chooses a vector x = (x1; x2; x3) of non-negative numbers summing to 1.
On the left of Figure 1 we illustrate the choice of vector x = (0:5; 0:25; 0:25)
with dotted lines of corresponding lengths. The Searcher then searches for
the material using a total search e¤ortof r = 0:7, which we think of as the
maximum amount of material the Searcher can nd. The Hider wins if he if left
with more than m = 0:5 of the material; the Searcher wins if she nds at least
m = 1  m = 0:5. A strategy for the Searcher is some vector y = (y1; y2; y3)
of non-negative numbers summing to at most r, which indicates the amount of
material she looks for in each location. On the right of Figure 1 we illustrate
the choice of y = (0:3; 0; 0:4) with the thickened lines at locations 1 and 3.
Figure 1. An example of the playersstrategies.
The amount found by the Searcher in each location depends on both the amount
hidden there, and the e¤ort she allocates to that location. Thus in location 1,
she looks for an amount of 0:3, and since there is at least this much material
this is the amount she nds. In location 2 she looks for no material, so she
does not nd any, and in location 3 she looks for 0:4, but since the amount of
material there is only 0:25, this is all she nds. In other words, the amount of
material she nds in a location is the minimum of the amount she looks for and
the amount that is hidden there. So in total she nds 0:3+0+0:25 = 0:55  m,
and thus wins the game.
We o¤er another interpretation of the model, which is a variant on the classic
newsvendor problem [8]. Suppose a newsvendor sells newspapers in a number
of locations. The total demand for newspapers is known but what is unknown
is how the demand is distributed amongst the locations. The newsvendor has a
xed number of newspapers she wants to sell and has to decide how to distribute
them amongst the locations. She has a target for the number of newspapers she
wants to sell and wishes to maximize the probability she reaches that target. We
think of this as a game against Nature, where the malevolent Nature (the Hider)
chooses how the demand is split between the various locations. The newsvendor
(the Searcher) decides how to allocate the newspapers to the locations; if she
allocates more newspapers than the demand then they will be wasted and if she
allocates too few she will miss out on the opportunity of sales. Thus her total
sales in any location are equal to the minimum of the demand and the number
of newspapers she allocates to the location.
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This example clearly departs from the classic newsvendor model in sev-
eral ways, in part because we assume the newsvendor wishes to maximize the
probability of reaching some target rather than to maximize her total expected
revenue. In some circumstances this choice of utility function for a business may
be justied, as argued in [11]. Indeed, in [15] the authors consider a newsvendor
model with a target prot. We might imagine that the newsvendor has been
hired for a trial period and will be given a permanent job if she reaches some
sales target. The idea of modeling several locations for the newsvendor is also
not without precedent, for example in [19].
The idea that the amount of material the Searcher captures in a location
should depend on her search e¤ort stems from the caching games studied in
[3] and [5], in which a Hider caches a number of discrete objects about various
locations. For example, a scatter hoarder such as squirrel buries nuts and a
pilferer digs holes in each location with the aim of nding the nuts. Thus the
number of nuts found in a given location depends on both the number of nuts
located there and the depth of the hole dug by the Searcher. The di¤erence in
our model is of course that the material being hidden is innitely divisible, not
discrete, which is closer in spirit to Kikuta and Ruckles original accumulation
games.
This work ts more widely into the sphere of search games. Good accounts
of the main results in this eld can be found in [7] and [14].
After dening our model precisely in Section 2, we go on to show how the
game can be viewed as a geometric game, as studied in [22]. See [10] for an
interesting discussion of some geometric games of Ruckles that have not received
much attention. In Section 3 we will see that in the case that the Searcher can
only win by nding all the material she is searching for (so r = m) and the
number of locations, n = 2, the game is equivalent to a form of Ruckles Interval
Hider Game. For n > 2, our game generalizes Ruckles, and we nd that solving
the game is far from trivial, but we give some solutions and bounds for the value
when n = 3. Finally, in Section 4, we go on to give a full solution of our game
for n = 2 and any value of r by reducing it to the case r = m.
2 Game denition and geometric interpretation
We formalize the game as follows. A Hider distributes some material of total
mass 1 about n  2 di¤erent locations. That is, he chooses an n-vector x =
(x1; :::; xn) of non-negative numbers with
Pn
i=1 xi = 1. A Searcher conscates
some of the material, but has enough resources to search for a total amount of
material equal to some r. That is, she chooses an n-vector y = (y1; :::; yn) of
non-negative numbers with
Pn
i=1 yi  r. The amount of material the Searcher
captures is M(x; y) =
Pn
i=1 minfxi; yig. The Hider wins if he is left with total
material greater than m, where 0 < m < 1. Or equivalently, the Hider loses
and the Searcher wins if the amount of material she nds satises M(x; y) 
m := 1  m, so we assume that r  m, otherwise the Hider trivially wins the
game. This is a zero-sum game, with payo¤ P (x; y) = 1 if the Searcher wins
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and P (x; y) = 0 if the Hider wins. We denote the game by   =  (n;m; r).
The Hider pure strategy set is the regular unit (n  1)-simplex n 1 =
fx 2 Rn : Pni=1 xi = 1g and the Searcher strategy set is the convex hull of the
zero vector and the regular (n  1)-simplex rn 1 (We use the standard term
regular simplex to mean a simplex whose sides all have the same length.) Since
the strategy sets are innite, we cannot use the standard minimax theorem for
nite zero-sum games to establish the existence of a value. However, both sets
strategy sets are compact and it is easy to see that the payo¤ function P (x; y)
is upper semicontinuous in both x and y: if P (x; y) = 1 then P is certainly
upper semicontinuous at (x; y) since P can only decrease. On the other hand, if
P (x; y) = 0 thenM(x; y) < m and any (x0; y0) within a radius of " = m M(x; y)
of (x; y) must also satisfy M(x0; y0) < m and hence P (x0; y0) = 0. Hence, the
existence theorem below follows from Alpern and Gals minimax theorem for
zero-sum games [6].
Theorem 1 The game   has a value. The Searcher has optimal strategies and
the Hider has "-optimal strategies.
We denote the value by V = V (n;m; r). Although the theorem guarantees
only "-optimal strategies for the Hider, we will see that for most of the cases we
consider the Hider has optimal strategies, as is commonly the case in the search
games literature. However in one case we will give only "-optimal strategies for
the Hider (see Proposition 9).
Every Searcher strategy is dominated by some y 2 rn 1, so in practice the
Searcher always has an optimal strategy with support in rn 1, and in general
we will assume the Searcher only uses such strategies. For any Searcher pure
strategy y 2 rn 1, we can consider the set S(y) of all Hider pure strategies
that it beats. That, is
S(y) = Sm(y) =

x 2 n 1 : P (x; y) = 1	 = x 2 n 1 : M(x; y)  m	 .
It is easy to verify that the set S(y) is closed and convex, and we denote the set
of all such S(y) by S = S (n;m; r) = S(y) : y 2 rn 1	. So now we can think
of the game as follows: the Hider picks a point x in the simplex n 1, and the
Searcher selects some subset of the simplex from S. The Searcher wins if and
only if the subset contains x. The game has been transformed into a geometric
game in which the Searcher is trying to capturethe Hiders point.
It is far from clear what the sets in S look like, but we will see in the next
section that they have a nice structure when r = m.
2.1 Related literature
The geometric interpretation of the game can be considered as a special case of
a more general game in which a Hider picks a point in a set X and a Searcher
picks one of a collection S of subsets of X whose union is the whole of X.
The Searcher wins if and only if the Hiders point is contained in her subset.
Such a game is considered in the context of information theory in [20] and
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[21]. In particular, the latter work considers this game in the case that X is
a compact metric space and the Searcher can pick any closed ball of radius r.
The authors prove a relation between the value of a restricted form of the game
and the absolute r-entropy, which can be computed from the covering number
of Cartesian powers of X. The authors restrict themselves to the case where
S consists of closed balls of a given radius, so their results do not immediate
apply to our game. In information theory, solutions to such games are di¢ cult
to compute even for small parameters, as we also nd in this paper. See [1] for
some open problems.
The game also has a relation to packing and covering problems. One form of
mixed strategy available to the Searcher in our game is an equiprobable choice
between some nite collection C of sets S(y) which cover the space n 1. If C
has size k then this strategy guarantees a payo¤ of at least 1=k for the Searcher,
and nding such a collection with minimal k is a covering problem. In a similar
way, the Hider may try to nd a strategy in which he makes an equiprobable
choice between a collection of points in n 1 at most one of which is beaten by
any given pure strategy of the Searcher. Choosing a minimal such collection of
points can be transformed into a packing problem.
A similar packing problem on the square is studied in a classic paper of
Erdös and Graham [13]. A covering problem for squares in considered in [23]
and a covering problem for equilateral triangles in [12]. The concept of the
weighted covering number of a convex set was recently introduced [9]. This
generalizes the idea of the covering number of a set and corresponds to general
mixed Searcher strategies in our game in a natural way.
3 The case r = m
We begin by analyzing the case where the amount of e¤ort, r that the Searcher
can use is equal to the minimum amount of material, m she must nd to win
the game. In other words, in order to win she has to nd all the material she
is searching for, so that the game we are considering is   (n;m; m). We make
this assumption throughout the rest of the section. It follows that the Searcher
wins if and only if yi  xi for i = 1; :::; n.
It is clear that the Hider can always guarantee that the value is at least
1=n by choosing randomly from the unit coordinate vectors, which we denote
by e1; :::; en. The only Searcher pure strategies that can win against this Hider
strategy with positive probability must be of the form mei for some i = 1; ::; n,
and such a strategy wins with probability 1=n. If the Searcher chooses randomly
between the vectors mei then she will win with probability at least 1=n as long
as she can be sure that there is at least m of material in at least one location.
This is true if the average amount of material 1=n in each location is at least
m, so we have the following.
Proposition 2 If m  1=n then V = 1=n. It is optimal for the Hider to hide
all the material in one randomly chosen location, and for the Searcher to look
for an amount m in one randomly chosen location.
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To analyze the game in this special case r = m, it is helpful to observe that
the set of Searcher strategies S has a special structure: S consists of precisely
all transformations of the regular simplex mn 1 that are contained in n 1.
Lemma 3 The set of Searcher strategies S is given by
S =T  n 1 : T = y +mn 1 for some y 2 Rn	 .
Proof. Suppose S(y) 2 S. We will show that S (y) = y+mn 1. By denition
of S(y),
S(y) =

x 2 n 1 : x  y  0	
=

y + z 2 n 1 : z  0	 , writing z = x  y,
=
(
y + z :
nX
i=1
zi = m, z  0
)
(since
nX
i=1
yi = m)
= y +mn 1:
Conversely, suppose T = y+mn 1 is contained in n 1 for some y 2 Rn.
We will show that y must be a valid Searcher strategy in mn 1, so that
T = S(y) 2 S. Let x be some element of T . We write x as x = y + mz with
z 2 n 1, and note that since T is a subset of n 1, the coordinates of x must
sum to 1. So
n+1X
i=1
yi + (1 m)
n+1X
i=1
zi = 1, or
n+1X
i=1
yi = m, since z 2 n 1.
We must also show that yi  0 for all i. Suppose some yi < 0. Then choose
some j 6= i and consider the unit vector in the j direction, ej 2 n 1. Then
the vector (1 m) ej + y is contained in S, and therefore in n 1, but has ith
coordinate of yi < 0, a contradiction. So yi  0 for all i and y 2 mn 1.
The signicance of Lemma 3 is that the game   can be considered as a
geometric game played on the unit regular (n  1)-simplex, where the Hider
picks a point x in n 1 and the Searcher picks a regular simplex S(y) = y +
mn 1 contained in n 1; the Searcher wins if and only if x 2 S(y).
We remark that the value of the game is increasing in m, since Sm(y) is
increasing in m with respect to set inclusion. Suppose for some m, a given
Searcher mixed strategy guarantees a payo¤ of V against any Hider strategy in
the game   (n;m; m). Then for m0 > m, the same Searcher mixed strategy is
also a valid strategy in   (n;m0; m0) and guarantees the same payo¤ of V against
any Hider strategy.
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3.1 Ruckles Interval Hider Game
For n = 2, our game translates to the following. The Hider picks a point x
in the interval [0; 1], the Searcher picks a subinterval of [0; 1] of length m and
the Searcher wins if and only if the Searchers subinterval contains the Hiders
point. This is an example of Ruckles Interval Hider Game [22]. In the most
general version of Ruckles game the Hider picks not a point but a subinterval
of given length and wins if the two subintervals have empty intersection.
The solution of the game in its full generality is given in [22], but we present
the solution to our particular version of the game for completeness (and in
fact we present slightly di¤erent optimal strategies to those given by Ruckle).
In particular, the proof is a good warm-up for the proofs found in the 2-
dimensional version of the game (when n = 3).
Proposition 4 Suppose n = 2 and 1= (t+ 1)  m < 1=t for a positive integer t.
Then the value V of the game   (n;m; m) is 1= (t+ 1) = d1=me. It is optimal for
the Hider to choose equiprobably between the t+ 1 equally spaced points starting
at 0 and ending at 1. It is optimal for the Searcher to choose the lower end of
her interval equiprobabably between the t+ 1 equally spaced points starting at 0
and ending at 1 m.
Proof. If the Hider uses the strategy given, then since the distance between the
adjacent points from which he chooses is 1=t > m, no interval of length m can
contain more than one of the points. So the Searcher can win with probability
no more than 1= (t+ 1), and V  1= (t+ 1) .
If the Searcher uses the strategy given, since m  1= (t+ 1), it is easy to see
that the t + 1 intervals from which she chooses cover the whole interval [0; 1],
so whichever point the Hider chooses the Searcher nds him with probability at
least 1= (t+ 1). Hence V  1= (t+ 1), and we must have equality.
3.2 A Triangle Hider Game
In this section we turn to the game played with n = 3, still assuming that
r = m. By Lemma 3, the game can be considered as follows. The Hider picks
a point on the unit equilateral triangle 2 and the Searcher picks a equilateral
triangle of edge length m in 2 (of the same orientation). The Searcher wins if
and only if her triangle contains the Hiders point.
We already know from Proposition 2 that if m  2=3 then the value of the
game is 1=3. The Hiders optimal strategy can be interpreted as as random
choice between the vertices of 2 and the Searcher optimal strategy can be
interpreted as a random choice between the triangles S mei (for i = 1; 2; 3).
These three triangles, which are the only triangles contained in 2 that contain
the vertices of 2 are depicted in Figure 2. It is clear from the gure that if
m  2=3, they cover the whole of 2. We will refer to these triangles as the
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vertex triangles, and denote them as Ei = Ei(m) for i = 1; 2; 3 .
Figure 2. The vertex
triangles, Ei.
We will see that when m = 1=2, the value of the game is 1=6. The optimal
Searcher strategy is simple, and is given in Lemma 5, and later we will give
"-optimal Hider strategies which are less straightforward to describe.
First a comment on our use of notation. Suppose y1; :::; yk are Searcher
pure strategies, and Tj = S(yj) for j = 1; :::; k. Then for the Searcher strategy
y =
P
iy
i we will use a slight abuse of notation to write
Pk
j=1 jT
j for S(y).
Lemma 5 If n = 3 and m = 1=2, the value of the game is at least 1=6. The
Searcher can guarantee an expected payo¤ of 1=6 by choosing a random vertex
triangle Ei with probability 1=2 and choosing the midpoint (Ei + Ej) =2 of two
randomly chosen vertex triangles Ei 6= Ej with probability 1=2.
Proof. To show the Searcher strategy wins with probability 1=6 it is su¢ cient
to show that every point x 2 2 is covered by one of the Searchers 6 pure
strategies. This is clear from drawing the 6 triangles corresponding to the
Searchers 6 pure strategies, and observing that their intersection covers the
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whole of 2, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. The Searchers
optimal strategy for m = 1=2.
For the rest of the values of m between 1=2 and 2=3, the solution of the game
is not straightforward. In the same way that the solution of Ruckles Interval
Hider Game broke down into discrete cases, so does the 2 dimensional version
of the game. We start by giving the solution for the interval 4=7  m < 2=3.
Proposition 6 If n = 3 and 4=7  m < 2=3 then it is optimal for the Hider
to choose with equal probability one of the three vertices of 2 or the vector
(1=3; 1=3; 1=3) in the center of 2. It is optimal for the Searcher to choose with
equal probability one of the vertex triangles Ei or the triangle (E1 + E2 + E3) =3
in the centreof 2. The value of the game is 1=4.
Proof. In Figure 4, the four Hider strategies are depicted on the left by the four
small black circles and the four Searcher strategies are depicted on the right.
Figure 4. The optimal strategies for 4=7  m < 2=3.
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It is clear from the left of Figure 4 that any Searcher strategy can only win
against one Hider pure strategy, since m < 2=3 so any S(y) of side length m
can contain only one of the Hiders pure strategies. This shows that the value
is at least 1=4.
Conversely, we need to show that every point x 2 2 is covered by at
least one of the given Searcher pure strategies. We can see informally from the
right hand side of Figure 4 that this is indeed the case. More precisely, we
rst suppose that some coordinate i of x is at least 3=7. Then x is covered
by Ei. Now suppose all the coordinates of x are at most 3=7, so that all the
coordinates of x must be at least 1=7. We note that (E1 + E2 + E3) =3 = S(y),
where y = ( m=3; m=3; m=3), and since m  3=7, all the coordinates of x are at
least m=3. So every x is covered by one of the 4 Searcher pure strategies, and
the value is at most 1=4. Combining this with the previous paragraph shows
that the value is exactly 1=4.
In order to solve the game for the remaining values of m between 1=2 and
4=7, we need an elementary lemma about triangles.
Lemma 7 Suppose T and T 0 are equilateral triangles of edge lengths s and
s0  s where T 0 can be obtained from T by a scaling and rotation of . Then
the maximum length of the intersection of T with the edges of T 0 (given by the
dotted lines in the diagram on the left of Figure 5) is 2s  s0.
Figure 5. The triangles T and T 0.
Proof. Let l1 be the total length of the intersection of T with the edges of T 0 and
let l2 be the length of the intersection of T 0 with the sides of T , as shown by the
dotted lines in the diagrams to the left and right of Figure 5, respectively. We
can assume that both of these intersections are made up of three disconnected
segments of positive length, as depicted in the gure, otherwise it is clear that
l1 could be increased by some translation of T in a direction parallel to one of
its edges. Then it is easy to see that the length of the perimeter of T is 2l1 + l2
and the length of the perimeter of T 0 is 2l1 + l2, so
3s = 2l1 + l2 and 3s0 = 2l2 + l1, hence l1 = 2s  s0.
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We now give a solution to the game for all m with 1=2 < m < 4=7. Every
such m lies in an interval It :=
h
2(t+1)
4(t+1) 1 ;
2t
4t 1

for some t = 2; 3; : : :, and the
solution of the game depends on which of these intervals m belongs to. For a
given interval It it turns out to be optimal for the Hider to mix between the ver-
tices of 2 and a nite subset of points on the perimeter of a particular triangle.
The vertices of this triangle, which we denote by Tt are the unique three points
at which the edges of the vertex triangles Ei (2t= (4t  1)) intersect, as depicted
in Figure 6. Thus the coordinates of the vertices of Tt are

2t 1
4t 1 ;
2t 1
4t 1 ;
1
4t 1

and all permutations thereof; the edges of Tt have length (2t  2) = (4t  1).
Figure 6. The triangle Tt and the Hiders optimal strategy.
We write Xt  Tt for the union of the three sets of t equally spaced points
on each edge of Tt starting at one vertex of the edge and ending at the other.
So Tt contains 3t points in total, a third of which are on each edge. Note that
the points on the vertices of Tt are countedtwice, so strictly speaking Xt is a
multiset. We illustrate the set of Hider strategies on the right of Figure 6 for
t = 4.
We now give the bound on the value obtained by the Hider using this strat-
egy.
Lemma 8 Suppose n = 3 and m < 2t4t 1 . Then if the Hider picks a random
vertex ei with probability p = t+22t+2 and with probability 1 p makes an equiprob-
able choice between all points in Xt, he ensures that the payo¤ of the game is
no more than p=3.
Proof. We must show that against any Searcher pure strategy this Hider strat-
egy guarantees the payo¤ is no more than p=3. If the Searchers triangle S(y)
is a vertex triangle Ei(m) then she wins with probability p=3 since Ei(m) must
contain precisely one vertex of 2 and does not intersect with Tt. If S(y) in-
tersects with Tt then it cannot contain any of the vertices of 2. We will show
that the number of elements N of Xt that are contained in S(y) can be no more
than t+ 2, so that the payo¤ is no more than (1  p) (t+ 2) = (3t) = p=3.
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Let N1; N2 and N3 be the number of elements of Xt contained in S(y) on
each of the edges of Tt. As mentioned earlier (and depicted in Figure 6), the
edges of Tt have length 2 (t  1) = (4t  1) and there are t points in Xt on each
edge of Tt so the distance between adjacent points on an edge is 2= (4t  1).
Hence the length l of the total intersection of S(y) and the edges of Tt must
satisfy
l 
3X
i=1
(Ni   1) 2
4t  1
= (N   3) 2
4t  1 , so
N 

4t  1
2

l + 3. (1)
By Lemma 7 we must have
l  2N   2t  2
4t  1
<
4t
4t  1  
2t  2
4t  1 (since N <
2t
4t  1 )
=
2t+ 2
4t  1 .
Substituting this into (1) gives N < t + 4. Now we note that the number of
members 3t N of Xt that are not contained in S(y) must be even (the reader
can convince herself of this by drawing an appropriate diagram). Hence N must
have the same parity as t, since 3t has the same parity as t, so N is at most
t+ 2.
Before we go on to dene the Searchers optimal strategies in the range
1=2 < m < 4=7, we can now see that the value of the game when m = 1=2 is
1=6, since the Searcher can guarantee a payo¤ of at least 1=6 by Lemma 5 and
for any " > 0, the Hider can guarantee the payo¤ is no more than 1=6 + " by
Lemma 8 choosing t to be su¢ ciently large.
Proposition 9 If n = 3 and m = 1=2 then the value of the game is 1=6.
The Searchers optimal strategy is to choose one of the vertex triangles with
probability 1=2 and to choose the midpoint of two vertex triangles with probability
1=2. The Hider has an "-optimal strategy given in Lemma 8 for t su¢ ciently
large.
We turn to the Searchers optimal strategy form in the interval It. It is su¢ -
cient to assume thatm takes the value of the lower bound 2 (t+ 1) = (4 (t+ 1)  1),
by the remark just before Subsection 3.1. We will see it is optimal for the
Searcher to pick one of the vertex triangles Ei(m) with probability p, and with
probability 1   p to choose randomly from a multiset Yt of 3t triangles. In or-
der to describe this multiset we rst dene the three triangles U1, U2 and U3
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as the unique equilateral triangles of side length m whose edges intersect with
precisely two of the vertices of Tt+1. These triangles correspond to the Searcher
strategies S(y) given by y =

2t 1
4t+3 ;
1
4t+3 ;
1
4t+3

and all permutations of these
coordinates. One of these three triangles is depicted in Figure 7.
Figure 7. One of the Searchers
strategies, Ui.
The set Yt contains the t equally spaced triangles starting from Ui and ending
at Uj for each i 6= j. That is, the t triangles given by (k=t)Ui + (t  k)=tUj for
k = 0; :::; t. Note that Yt contains two copies of each of U1, U2 and U3.
Lemma 10 Suppose n = 3 and m = 2(t+1)4(t+1) 1 . Then if the Searcher chooses
equiprobably between the vertex triangles Ei(m) with probability p = t+22t+2 and
with probability 1   p picks a random triangle from Yt then she wins the game
with probability at least p=3.
Proof. If the Hiders point is located in one of the vertex triangles Ei then
clearly the Searcher wins with probability p=3. So suppose not, and the Hiders
point must be located in Tt+1. We need to show that every point of Tt+1 is
contained in at least t + 2 of the triangles in Yt. We prove this by considering
the triangulation of Tt+1 into t2 congruent equilateral triangles, as depicted in
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Figure 8 for t = 5. We denote the set of t2 triangles in the triangulation by T .
Figure 8. The triangulation of Tt+1.
The Searchers strategy has been designed in such as way that each triangle in
T is either contained in or disjoint from every triangle in Yt, as shown in Figure
8. (We say disjointhere to mean the measure of the intersection is 0.) We will
show that each triangle in T is contained in at least t+ 2 of the triangles in Yt.
The triangles in T can be partitioned into two sets, the set T1 of triangles with
the same orientation as Tt+1 and the set T2 of triangles whose orientation is the
same as Tt+1 rotated by . Consider some R 2 T2, and let R0 be a neighboring
triangle in T1. If R0 is contained in some triangle in Yt then R is also contained
in it. Thus it is su¢ cient to show that all triangles in T1 are contained in at
least t+ 2 of the triangles in Yt.
The position of each triangle R 2 T1 can be specied by its rowwith respect
to each of the edges of Tt+1, where a row consists of all the triangles in T1 with
the same perpendicular distance to that edge. Thus there are t rows with respect
to any given edge of Tt+1, and we label them 1 to t, where row 1 is the closest
to the edge. In fact, the position of some R 2 T1 can be exactly specied by
which row it is in with respect to any two of the edges of Tt+1, since the sum
of the three rows that R is contained in must be t+ 2. Now we simply observe
that if a triangle R 2 T1 is contained in rows i, j and k with respect to the three
edges of Tt+1 then R is contained in exactly i+ j + k = t+ 2 of the triangles in
Yt, which completes the proof.
We now put together Lemma 8 and Lemma 10.
Theorem 11 Suppose n = 3 and 2(t+1)4(t+1) 1  m < 2t4t 1 , where t is a positive
integer. Then the value of the game is t+26t+6 , and optimal strategies for the
players are given by Proposition 2, Proposition 6, Lemma 8 and Lemma 10.
In Figure 9 below we show a plot of the value of the game for all values of
m between 1=2 and 1.
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Figure 9. The value of the game for n = 3 and 1=2  m  1.
We observe that in order to nd the solution of the game in these cases, we
have relied heavily on our geometric interpretation of the game. It seems unlikely
that the solution could have been found using any intuition in the original form
of the game. For example, let us consider the game wherem = 17=32 = 0:53125,
so that t = 4. To calculate the Hiders optimal strategy, we rst see that the
coordinates of the vertices of Tt are
 
2t 1
4t ;
2t 1
4t ;
1
4t

= (7=15; 7=15; 1=15) and
all permutations thereof. Hence the optimal strategy for the Hider is to choose
with probability 3=5 one of the 3 permutations of (1; 0; 0), with probability 1=5
one of the 3 permutations of (7=15; 7=15; 1=15) and with probability 1=5 one of
the 6 permutations of (3=15; 5=15; 7=15).
For the Searchers optimal strategy, we assume thatm = 2 (t+ 1) = (4 (t+ 1)  1) =
10=19, since the Searcher is allowed to use any pure strategies y whose coordi-
nates sum to no more than 17=32 > 10=19. The triangles U1; U2 and U3 are given
by y = (7=19; 1=19; 1=19) and permutations of these coordinates. So the optimal
Searcher strategy is to choose with probability 3=5 one of the 3 permutations of
(9=19; 0; 0), with probability 1=5 one of the 3 permutations of (1=19; 1=19; 7=19)
and with probability 1=5 one of the 6 permutations of (1=19; 3=19; 5=19).
The value of the game is (t+ 2) = (6t+ 6) = 1=5.
3.3 Some bounds on the value
For the range 0 < m < 1=2 we do not o¤er a general solution to the game, but
we give some bounds on the value.
Theorem 12 The value V of the game satises
2
d2=me (d2=me   1)  V  m
2.
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Proof. If the Hider uses the uniform strategy, where each measurable subset
of the triangle is chosen with probability proportional to its measure, then the
payo¤ against any Searcher pure strategy is m2, so the value of the game is at
most m2.
Since V (m) is increasing in m, it is su¢ cient to assume that 2=m = d2=me,
so that the lower bound for the value in the statement of the theorem is
m2= (2 m).
We will give (2 m) =m2 Searcher strategies such that every point in 2
is covered by one of the strategies. We subdivide 2 into (2=m)2 congruent
equilateral triangles of side length m=2. We denote this set of smaller triangles
by T . A Searcher pure strategy S(y)  2, if appropriately positioned, can
contain exactly 4 of the triangles in T . Consider all possible such Searcher pure
strategies. The total number of these strategies is t(k) where k = 2=m  1 and
t(k) =
 
1+k
2

is the kth triangular number. Every triangle in T is contained
in at least one of these pure strategies, so if the Searcher chooses each of them
equiprobably then any point in 2 is found with probability at least 1=t(k) =
m2= (2 m). This completes the proof.
The upper bound in Theorem 12 is only tight form = 1, because the Searcher
needs to be able to non-wastefully cover 2 in triangles of side length m.
However, in the range of value of m for which we have solved the game,
the lower bound is tight when m = 1, 2=3 or 1=2. In each of these cases
d2=me = 2=m, and the Searcher strategy used in the proof above is optimal.
We conjecture that the bound is always tight when d2=me = 2=m.
Conjecture 13 If n = 3 and 2=m is an integer, then the value of the game is
1=t(k), where k = 2=m   1. The Searcher has an optimal strategy where she
chooses equiprobably between t(k) strategies that cover the triangle 2.
We go one stage further. Let Pn(k) be the kth simplicial (n  1)-polytopic
number given by
Pn (k) =

n+ k   2
k

,
so when n = 3, Pn(k) = t(k). Proposition 2 tells us that for m  (n  1) =n, the
value of the game is d(n  1) =me = 1=Pn(k), where k = d(n  1) =me   n + 2.
We o¤er a generalized version of Conjecture 13.
Conjecture 14 If d(n  1) =me is an integer then the value of the game is
1=Pn(k), where k = d(n  1) =me n+ 2. The Searcher has an optimal strategy
where she chooses equiprobably between Pk(n) strategies that cover n 1.
Note that this conjecture is certainly true when n = 2.
4 The case r > m
We now turn to the case where r is not necessarily equal to m, which we shall
see is more di¢ cult in general. For n = 2 we show that the game reduces to an
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instance of the game when r = m, and so the solution is given by the previous
section.
We rst note that for particular choices of the parameters the game is trivial
and the Searcher can always win.
Lemma 15 If r  n m then V = 1. The Searcher can win by allocating equal
weight r=n to all locations.
Proof. Let y be the Searcher strategy described above. Suppose xi  m for
some i. Then since yi = r=n  m, we have M(x; y)  mini fxi; r=ng  m.
Conversely, if xi < m for all i then xi < r=n, so M(x; y) =
nX
i=1
xi = 1  m.
Either way, P (x; y) = 1 so the Searcher always wins and V = 1.
Unlike in the case r = m, in the more general case, the sets S(y) do not have
a form that is easy to express. To simplify the analysis, we will dene another
game ~  which has the same value as  .
Denition 16 Let ~  = ~  (n;m; r) be the zero-sum game between a Hider and
Searcher in which the Hiders strategy set is n 1 and the Searchers strategy
set is

y 2 Rn :
nP
i=1
yi = r

. For a Hider strategy x and Searcher strategy y, the
payo¤ is 1 if an only if M (x; y) :=
nP
i=1
min fxi; yig  m, otherwise the payo¤ is
0:
The game ~  is the same as   in every respect except that the strategy set of
the Searcher is larger, since the components of a Searcher strategy y are allowed
to be negative. This means the value of ~  must be at least the value of   since
the Searcher has an advantage. But in fact it is easy to show that the Searcher
cannot do any better in ~ .
Lemma 17 The value ~V of ~  is the same as the value V of  .
Proof. As noted above, ~V  V . To show the reverse inequality, let y be a
Searcher strategy in ~ , and we will show that y is dominated by some strategy
y0 in  . If all the components of y are non-negative then y is already a strategy
in  . If not, then suppose yi is negative for some i. There must be some other
set of components J  f1; : : : ; ng of y whose sum is at least  yi. We dene y0
by y0i = 0 and we add a total of yi to the components yj with j 2 J in such
a way that they all still remain positive. Then for any Hider strategy x, the
contribution to M (x; y) from the ith component is increased by  yi from yi to
0 and the sum of the contributions from the components in J is decreased by
no more than  yi, so that M (x; y0)  M (x; y) and V  ~V . Hence the values
are equal.
For the game   we dened the set S (y) as the set of Hider strategies beaten
by a Searcher strategy y. We now dene analagous sets ~S (y) = fx 2 Rn : M (x; y)  mg
for the game ~ . The di¤erence here is that ~S (y) is not limited to points in the
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Hiders strategy set, but contains all vectors x in Rn with M (x; y)  m (note
that we are extending the domain ofM to the whole of RnRn). For a Searcher
strategy y in  , the set S (y) can be expressed as ~S (y)\n 1. We can now think
of the game ~  geometrically as follows: the Hider picks a point x 2 n 1 and
the Searcher picks a set ~S (y). The Searcher wins if and only if x is contained
in ~S (y). We denote the collection of all sets ~S (y) by ~S = ~S (n;m; r).
The advantage to analyzing the game   through the lens of ~  is that the sets
~S (y) are easier to describe than the sets S (y). In fact, they are just translations
of each other.
Lemma 18 If y is a Searcher strategy in ~  then ~S is the set of all translations
of ~S (y) by some a 2 Rn such that
nP
i=1
ai = 0.
Proof. Let a 2 Rn be such that
nP
i=1
ai = 0. Then
~S (y + a) =
(
x 2 Rn :
nX
i=1
min fxi; yi + aig  m
)
=
(
x 2 Rn :
nX
i=1
(min fxi   ai; yig+ ai)  m
)
= a+
(
x0 2 Rn :
nX
i=1
min fx0i; yig  m
)
(substituting x0 = x  a and using
nX
i=1
ai = 0)
= a+ ~S (y) .
Since any Searcher strategy can be expressed as y + a for some such a, this
proves the lemma.
For the remainder of this section we will consider the case n = 2. Lemma 15
says that V = 1 if r  2 m, so we will restrict attention to the case r < 2 m. As
in Subsection 3.1 we can consider the Hiders strategy set as the unit interval
[0; 1], so that instead of considering a Hider strategy as a vector (x; 1  x) we
consider it as a point x 2 [0; 1]. Similarly, the Searchers strategy set in   can be
considered as the interval [0; r], so that a vector (y; 1  y) corresponds to a point
y 2 [0; r]; for ~  the Searchers strategy set can be considered as R. For a given
Hider strategy x and Searcher strategy y (in either   or ~ ) the Searcher wins if
and only if M (x; y) = min fx; yg+ min f1  x; r   yg  m. The sets S(y) must
be subintervals of [0; 1], since these are the only closed, convex subsets. The
sets ~S (y) must also be intervals in R for the same reason.
From this we can deduce the value of the game   when n = 2 by reducing
it to the case r = m.
Theorem 19 When n = 2 and r  2 m, the solution of the game  (n;m; r) is
given by the solution of   (n;m0; m0), where m0 = 2m+ r   1 and m0 = 1 m0.
The value of the game is d1= (2m+ r   1)e.
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Proof. The value of the game   (n;m; r) is the same as the value of the game
~  (n;m; r), by Lemma 17. If we take the Searcher strategy y = r in ~  (n;m; r)
then M (x; y)  m if and only if x  m and 1   x  m   r, so ~S (y) =
[ m; r + 1  m]. This is an interval of length r + 1   2 m = 2m + r   1, so
~S (n;m; r) must consist of all intervals of this length by Lemma 18. But by the
same reasoning, in the game ~  (n;m0; m0), the corresponding set ~S (n;m0; m0)
must consist of all intervals of length 2m0 + m0   1 = m0 = 2m + r   1, so
~S (n;m; r) = ~S (n;m0; m0). Hence the game ~  (n;m; r)must have the same value
as ~  (n;m0; m0), which by Lemma 17 is the same as the value of   (n;m0; m0),
which by Proposition 4 is d1=m0e = d1= (2m+ r   1)e.
5 Conclusion
We have dened a new caching game where a Hider caches an amount of material
scaled to 1 and a Searcher uses search e¤ort of r to try and nd m of the
material. We showed that the game can be considered as a geometric game
played on the regular n-simplex. We rst considered the case where r = m so
that the Searcher could only win by nding all the material she was searching for,
and we found that in this case the game has a particularly attractive geometric
interpretation. For n = 2 we saw that the game had already been solved by
Ruckle. For n = 3 we solved the game for m  1=2, giving bounds on the value
for m < 1=2, and for general n we conjectured the that the value of the game
is given by the inverse of the simplicial polytopic numbers if (n  1) =m is an
integer. We also showed that the more general case r  m reduces to the case
r = m for n = 2.
There is clearly much more work that can be done on this game. In par-
ticular, it may be possible to nd solutions of the game for n = 3 and r = m
when m < 1=2, or at least verify Conjecture 13. We have concentrated on the
case r = m in this paper, but another direction that could be taken is to study
the game in the more general case r  m, starting with an investigation of the
structure of S (y) for n = 3, perhaps by extending the method used in Section
4 of dening sets ~S (y).
We also note that the game has another interpretation as a specic case of
a game played on a network with distinguished root O. The Hider chooses a
connected subset of the network of measure 1 which contains O and the Searcher
chooses a connected subset of the network of measure r which contains O. The
Searcher wins if and only if the measure of the intersection of the sets is at least
m. In the case that the network is a uniform star (a set of unit arcs meeting at
O), this game is equivalent to  . The author would like to thank Steve Alpern
for this observation. Further work could investigate this more general game on
other types of networks, for example the circle.
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